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The Transactional Interpretation of quantum mechanics is a promising way of fulfilling Einstein’s vision of a completed quantum mechanics. However, it has received forceful criticism from Maudlin. Indeed, I shall argue that the force of Maudlin’s criticisms has been underestimated, and that none of the extant responses are adequate. An adequate response, I contend, requires reconceptualizing the kinds of explanations the Transactional Interpretation gives. I sketch such a reinterpretation and argue that it does not fall prey to Maudlin’s objections. However, there remain significant obstacles in the way of formulating a fully adequate version of the Transactional Interpretation. 

1. Einstein’s vision and the Transactional Interpretation
The quantum mechanical description of reality, as Einstein discerned, is incomplete (Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen 1935). For example, there are circumstances in which the position of a particle can be predicted with certainty, and yet the particle has no value for position according to standard quantum mechanics (plus certain plausible assumptions). Einstein envisioned supplementing the quantum mechanical description with additional parameters—local hidden variables—to complete the description. In the case of position, this amounts to the ascription of trajectories to particles, even when standard quantum mechanics assigns no such trajectory. But Bell (1964) showed that no assignment of local hidden variables can be made consistent with the empirical predictions of quantum mechanics, so Einstein’s vision of a complete quantum mechanical description seems impossible to fulfill.
There is, however, a loophole in Bell’s theorem. Bell assumes that the values of the local hidden variables are independent of which properties of the system are later measured. Prima facie, this seems like a reasonable assumption; the dependence of the current state of the system on future choices about what properties of the system to measure is tantamount to backwards causation. But as Price (1994) has observed, if this assumption is violated—if backwards causation is admitted—then Bell’s theorem provides no barrier, in principle, to the addition of local hidden variables to quantum mechanics.
The Transactional Interpretation of quantum mechanics (Cramer 1986) provides a concrete example of how a theory incorporating a form of backwards causation can bypass Bell’s theorem. Cramer notes that the relativistic wave equation governing quantum mechanics has both retarded solutions—waves travelling forwards in time—and advanced solutions—waves travelling backwards in time. The latter are usually rejected as unphysical, but in the Transactional Interpretation (TI) they are incorporated into the physical explanations given by the theory. Consider the standard EPR-Bell set-up; a source emits two spin-1/2 particles in the singlet state 2–1/2(|↑|↓ – |↓|↑), which travel in opposite directions to two spin detectors, each of which magnetically deflects spin-up particles upwards and spin-down particles downwards (relative to some axis) and then collides them with a fluorescent screen. Suppose that the spin detectors in the two wings are aligned along the same axis. The TI analyses this system in terms of retarded offer waves travelling forwards in time from the particle emission event to potential particle absorption events, and advanced confirmation waves travelling backwards in time from the absorption events to the emission event. The offer wave travels outwards in both directions from the particle source and splits into two components at each magnet. In each wing, then, there are two places where the offer wave hits the screen, and at each of these potential particle absorption events a confirmation wave is generated back towards the emission event, with amplitude equal to that of the incident offer wave at that point. Hence the emission event receives two confirmation waves from the left and two from the right, each of amplitude 1/2. These can be regarded as competing possibilities, where the amplitude of the confirmation wave received by the source corresponds to the probability that the corresponding possibility is chosen as the actual particle path. Conservation of spin at the source means that if the upward-deflecting path is chosen on the right, the downward-deflecting path is chosen on the left, and vice versa. 
The result of this interplay of offer and confirmation waves is a transaction; a pair of particle paths from emission to absorption. Note that the positions of the particles are never indeterminate; each particle has a value for position even when its (standard) state is not an eigenstate of the position operator. Similarly, each particle can be said to have a determinate value for spin in the direction in which the spins are measured. But there is no need to assign spin values for every direction in which the spins might have been measured—the task that Bell showed was impossible. This is because the confirmation wave carries information about the measurements that will later be carried out back to the earlier emission event.
Hence the TI provides a promising avenue for completing quantum mechanics in line with Einstein’s vision. However, it has been forcefully criticized by Maudlin (1994, 197–200). Although defenses against these criticisms have been constructed, I will argue that the force of Maudlin’s criticism has been underestimated, and that none of the extant replies are adequate to defend the TI. I will suggest a sense in which the TI requires further completion in response to Maudlin’s arguments, and investigate whether such a completion is possible. The main danger, I argue, is that the TI reduces to a form of the many-worlds theory.
2. Maudlin’s critique
Maudlin advances several criticisms of the TI, but here I concentrate on the two main ones. The first concerns the kinds of explanation the theory gives. The above account of spin measurements on a singlet state follows Cramer’s preferred mode of explanation, the pseudotime sequence. That is, the explanation proceeds in the following order: Offer waves are emitted at the source and travel to potential absorption sites, where they trigger confirmation waves that travel back to the source, where in turn the amplitudes of the returned confirmation waves correspond to the probability that the relevant trajectory is chosen as the completed transaction. Clearly this explanation does not constitute a genuine sequence of events, since taken as such it would ascribe contradictory properties to a single spacetime location. So in order for the TI to provide a consistent description of reality, one has to conclude that the events of the pseudotime sequence do not actually occur, and that what actually occurs is the completed transaction—the particles travel from the source to the detectors along the chosen trajectory. Hence Cramer describes the pseudotime sequence as “a semantic device” and “a pedagogical convention” (1986, 661). But as Maudlin complains, “all of the seeming illumination provided by the account depends on the pseudotime narrative”, so without the narrative there is no explanation (1994, 198).
Maudlin’s second criticism of the TI, the one that leads him to conclude that “Cramer’s theory collapses” (1994, 200), concerns a particular example. Suppose a source emits either a particle to the right or a particle to the left at time t0; the initial (standard) quantum state is a superposition of a left-travelling particle and a right-travelling particle, with equal amplitudes. If the particle is emitted to the right it is absorbed at absorber A (on the right) at time t1. If no absorption occurs at A at t1, an absorber B is swung from its initial position behind absorber A to a point on the left, where it absorbs the particle at t2. The puzzle here is that the equiprobability of the two outcomes demands that equal amplitude confirmation waves be received from absorber A and absorber B. But if B sends back a confirmation wave, then it must have been struck by an offer wave, so it must have swung over to the left. And if it has swung over to the left, then the particle is not detected at A. So when a confirmation wave is received from absorber B, the particle must always go to absorber B, despite the fact that the amplitude of the confirmation wave is 1/2. That is, the TI is simply inconsistent.
3. The responses of Berkovitz and Kastner
It is the latter objection that Maudlin regards as the killer one, and this is the objection on which attempts to defend the TI have concentrated. Berkovitz (2002) notes that in the context of the TI, Maudlin’s example constitutes a causal loop; absorber B, if it swings round, sends a signal back in time to the source indicating that it has swung round, which in turn requires the particle to be emitted to the left. In causal loops, long-run frequencies need not be close to the objective chances of the corresponding events. As an example, Berkovitz asks us to consider tossing a fair coin in circumstances in which a result of heads backwards-causally initiates the coin toss. The long-run frequency of heads in repetitions of this case is clearly 1, but (arguably) the objective chance of heads is still 1/2, since the coin is still intrinsically a fair one. Similarly, Berkovitz claims, the inconsistency Maudlin imputes to the TI disappears; the fact that the particle always goes to absorber B when it swings round is consistent with the fact that the chance of the particle going to absorber B is 1/2. The strength of the confirmation wave corresponds to the chance, not the long-run frequency.
However, Berkovitz notes that a difficulty for the TI remains; since the link between objective chance and long-run frequency is broken, the theory fails to predict the long-run frequencies of outcomes. Kastner (2006) attempts to solve this problem by taking a different approach to Maudlin’s challenge. According to Kastner, the problem stems from taking the particle emission event as the “branch point”—the point at which the determinate past branches into two possible futures. Although this is typically the way in which the formation of transactions is described, it is not appropriate in this case, because the set of confirmation waves received at the emitter depends on the later state of the detectors—i.e. on whether absorber B has swung round. Hence there is no unambiguous emitter state to act as a fixed branch point. Rather, one should take as the branch point a point in the causal story at which the state is independent of the outcome. Kastner identifies this point as the field made up of the offer wave and confirmation wave to and from absorber A, since this field exists whether the particle is detected at A or at B. Then the “branching event” consists in this field either becoming a realized transaction (i.e. it is the actual trajectory of the particle) or it becoming a failed transaction (i.e. the particle goes to absorber B). Since the field at the branch point has strength 1/2, the TI correctly ascribes probabilities based on field strength.
But Kastner’s solution is not without its problems. Note the scare quotes in the above description of the “branching event”; the field that constitutes the “branch point” does not become either a realized or a failed transaction, since (as noted above), the pseudotime sequence is incoherent. Indeed, Kastner too rejects the pseudotime sequence, and notes of the “branching event” that “absent the “pseudotime” account we don’t as yet even have a heuristic way to understand this process” (2006, 9). In fact, the branch point itself doesn’t exist; there is no such field, since there is only a completed transaction (a particle trajectory between the emitter and absorber A) or a failed one (no such trajectory). Kastner’s point, I take it, is that if the goal is to provide a consistent recipe for ascribing probabilities to outcomes, then the non-existence of the branching event is beside the point. The boundary conditions of the problem yield a determinate value for this hypothetical field, and whether or not the field exists, one can appeal to this value to ascribe consistent probabilities to outcomes, hence undermining Maudlin’s assertion that the TI contradicts itself in its probability ascriptions.
4. Maudlin’s critique restated
If the challenge of Maudlin’s example were just to find a consistent way of ascribing probabilities to outcomes, then Kastner’s solution might be sufficient. But although Maudlin poses the problem in terms of inconsistent probabilities, the real force of his challenge, I think, has been misconstrued. The goal of the TI is to find a way of “treating the wave function as physically present in space” rather than as “a purely mathematical construct used for calculation” (Cramer 2006, 21) After all, we already have a consistent (if incomplete) way of ascribing probabilities to outcomes, namely standard quantum mechanics. Maudlin’s point (I take it) is that the application of the TI’s mode of physical explanation to his example yields inconsistent probabilities. Kastner shows how to ascribe consistent probabilities at the cost of giving up the physical explanation—but this is to give up on precisely what makes the TI distinctive.
	Of course, the kind of physical explanation we are talking about here is the pseudotime sequence, and as Maudlin makes clear in his first objection to the TI, the pseudotime sequence is incoherent. Without a replacement for the pseudotime sequence, we can’t assess the force of Maudlin’s second objection; we can’t tell whether the physical explanation provided by the TI yields inconsistent probability assignments in Maudlin’s example, because we are unable to produce the explanation. So before we return to Maudlin’s example, let us first see if there is a better way of understanding the kind of explanations the TI gives.
Immediately following the description of the pseudotime narrative, Cramer notes that “an equally valid interpretation of the process is that a four-vector standing wave has been established between emitter and absorber” (1986, 663). In fact, I think something stronger can be said; the standing wave interpretation is a better description of the physical process that gives rise to the transaction. A standing wave is essentially a solution to a constraint problem, where the constraints are (i) the boundary conditions and (ii) the stability of the solution over time. Similarly, the transaction that results from a TI-style analysis of a quantum system can be regarded as the solution to a constraint problem. Again, the first set of constraints are the boundary conditions at the emission and absorption events; the offer and confirmation waves are the time-reverse of each other, and conserved quantities at the boundaries are respected. But the second kind of constraint is inappropriate; since there is no extra time dimension over which the solution could be stable, stability over time is not applicable to a standing wave in four-dimensional spacetime, and we can simply drop this as a constraint. The result is an explanation of the following form; the state of the world is one of the possible transactions because the possible transactions exhaust the consistent solutions to the wave equation. The offer and confirmation waves are not successive elements of the explanation on this account; rather, the only role they play is that it is the amplitude of the (notional) confirmation wave at the source which is ascribed to the transaction as its probability.
Put this way, the TI looks rather trivial; the state of a quantum system is simply a solution of the quantum-mechanical wave equation subject to the boundary conditions. But it is not quite as trivial as it looks. If (as we are assuming) the quantum-mechanical wave equation admits both retarded and advanced solutions, then finding a consistent solution requires treating the system as a four-dimensional whole; the properties of the particles at emission depend (in part) on the location of their (later) absorption. That is, the wave equation and boundary conditions impose stringent consistency conditions on the kinds of trajectory that can constitute the four-dimensional transactions. This point has been made with respect to backwards causation many times, especially in the context of time travel; sets of events that may be mutually consistent in ordinary contexts become inconsistent—and hence impossible—in contexts where backwards causation is involved (Horwich 1987, 118–119).
	With this interpretation of the TI in mind, we can return to evaluate the force of Maudlin’s main objection. Does the analysis of his example in terms of four-dimensional standing waves (rather than in terms of the pseudotime sequence) render it less problematic? Prima facie, no. Note that a standing wave explanation requires fixed boundary conditions, which is precisely what Maudlin’s example lacks. If one takes the emitter/absorber structure as constituting the boundary conditions, then the presence of an absorber whose position depends on the outcome of the measurement makes a straightforward standing-wave analysis impossible.
Put another way, the analysis of Maudlin’s example requires including some of the detection apparatus—namely absorber B—as part of the quantum mechanical system rather than as part of the environment. Consider how the example might be analyzed in Everettian “many-worlds” quantum mechanics. The initial state of the system (just after the particle has been emitted) can be written 2–1/2(|L​p + |Rp)|RB, where |L​p and |Rp are states of the particle in which it is emitted to the left and to the right, respectively, and |RB is the state of absorber B in which it is located on the right. The final state of the system (after absorption of the particle) can be written 2–1/2(|B​p|LB + |Ap|RB), where |Ap and |Bp are states of the particle in which it is absorbed by absorber A and B, respectively, and |LB is the state of absorber B in which it has swung to the left. Everettians will take this final state as representing two distinct and equiprobable branches of reality, one containing each outcome of the experiment. Bohmians will claim that one of these terms is the actual state of the world—namely the one containing the Bohmian world-particle. Collapse theorists will claim that a stochastic process at some stage will eliminate one term in favor of the other. But note that in each case, the analysis requires the inclusion of absorber B in the quantum state.
The problem is that as it stands, the TI provides no way of doing this, since it presupposes determinate particle emission and absorption events bookending the analysis, and these are precisely what is absent in Maudlin’s example. However, Marchildon (2006) has suggested that determinate emission and absorption events can be found even in this case if one casts a wider net. After all, every particle is absorbed eventually, so every offer wave will trigger a confirmation wave at this potential absorption point. In particular, in Maudlin’s example, the offer wave to the left triggers a confirmation wave at some distant point C, just as the offer wave to the right triggers a confirmation wave at absorber A. Hence the emission event receives two confirmation waves of equal amplitude, and the amplitude of the confirmation waves can, after all, determine the probabilities of the two outcomes.
This looks like a very straightforward solution to Maudlin’s challenge, but unfortunately it is inadequate. The reason is that the distant absorption point is the wrong absorption point; the potential transactions on offer are between the source and either absorber A or distant point C, whereas the actual particle trajectory is between the source and either absorber A and absorber B. Thus a physical explanation in terms of actual particle trajectories still eludes us, and Maudlin’s example remains problematic.
5. The Transactional Interpretation completed? 
Perhaps this is not surprising, as Marchildon too fails to include the motion of absorber B in the analysis of the system. So let us now consider how that might be done. The most straightforward approach is the following: Absorber B is a physical system made up of particles, and these particles (let us assume) were emitted somewhere and will eventually be absorbed somewhere. So we can treat the trajectories of the particles making up absorber B as we treat the test particle. That is, the constraint problem gets broader in scope; we require a consistent solution to the quantum-mechanical wave equation for the system consisting of the test particle plus the moving absorber, and encompassing both retarded and advanced waves. The hope is that there are only two such solutions corresponding to the two possible outcomes of the experiment.
But immediately there are difficulties. The first difficulty with expanding the TI in this way is that it is not clear how to define the space of possible trajectories. In this case, the test particle is created at the beginning of the experiment and destroyed at the end, but the particles making up absorber B last much longer, and perhaps for different lengths of time from each other. If one envisions solving the constraint problem in terms of retarded and advanced waves in a configuration space, then one needs a fixed set of particles over time to define the configuration space in which the solutions live.
Hence a fully relativistic (field-theoretic) account will need to operate in a more general space. But for the moment (and in the spirit of Cramer’s own approach) let us finesse this problem in the following semi-relativistic way. Treat the system consisting of the source, the test particle and the absorbers as a toy universe—that is, the objects and events of the experiment can be regarded as exhausting the contents of the universe. Assume that the set of particles in this toy universe remains fixed; all the particles are created at the beginning of the universe and destroyed at the end, and the emission and absorption events can be regarded as release and capture of the test particle. Then there is a well-defined configuration space in which solutions to the quantum mechanical wave equation can be constructed. The constraints on these solutions are the Cramer boundary conditions; the advanced wave is the time-reverse of the retarded wave at the particle creation and destruction events (i.e. the beginning and end of the universe). Again, the hope is that there are precisely two such solutions, one in which the test particle is absorbed by A on the right (and absorber B remains on the right), and one in which the test particle is absorbed by B on the left.
If this kind of explanation works, there is no reason why it should not be applicable to systems of any complexity. This would constitute a vindication of Einstein’s vision for completing quantum mechanics, at least within the constraints of my idealizing assumptions; there is a single, determinate trajectory through configuration space from the beginning of time to the end of time, and hence every particle always has a determinate position, whether or not its state (under the standard analysis) is an eigenstate of position.
 But there is a second difficulty with this kind of completion of the TI. I said that the hope is that there are exactly two solutions in the case of Maudlin’s example. But without further constraints, this hope cannot be realized; assuming that the two desired trajectories are solutions, the superposition principle entails that any linear superposition of these trajectories is also a solution. But a superposition of the two trajectories is not a state in which the test particle can be ascribed a determinate position, and it does not explain why we get one result to the experiment rather than the other. Or rather, if it does explain why we get one result rather than another, it is only in an Everettian sense; the TI turns out to be yet another many-worlds theory in denial (to paraphrase Deutsch 1996).
In part, this difficulty can be addressed by stipulation; we stipulate that the final state, like the initial state, is a state in which the particles concerned have determinate positions, thereby ruling out superpositions of the two solutions in the above case. And this is not so ad hoc in a retrocausal theory in which final states have a similar status to initial states. But it is only a partial solution, in that a system whose initial state and final state determine the positions of the particles involved can still pass through superposed states that do not determine particle positions. Indeed, this possibility is crucial to the adequacy of the TI; as Cramer himself notes, in cases of interference, the amplitude of the confirmation wave returning to the source from a particular outcome depends on contributions following a number of different trajectories, and hence the completed transaction forms along all these trajectories simultaneously (2005, 67). That is, in a case such as two-slit interference, the completed transaction forms between the source and a particular point on the screen, but passes through both slits.
The hope, of course, is that this kind of behavior can be confined to the microscopic realm—that there are no macroscopically disjoint transactions. But is this hope realized? Decoherence provides some grounds for thinking that it is, since it (apparently) entails that interference between terms corresponding to macroscopically disjoint states of affairs is astronomically unlikely. But in the context of a time-symmetric theory like the TI we need to tread carefully. For example, suppose that the universe is a highly time-symmetric one in which entropy decreases in the latter temporal half (Price 1996, 81). Then decoherence arguments will fail for the TI applied to the universe as a whole, since the arguments will apply in the reverse temporal direction in the latter half of the universe. This leaves open the possibility that the initial and final states of the universe determine the positions of the particles, but the transaction between them is the superposition of every possible trajectory of the particles. In this case, the TI really would become a kind of many-worlds theory.
Even esoteric possibilities like this aside, decoherence arguments only get you so far. After all, decoherence does not rule out any influence between terms corresponding to macroscopically distinct states of affairs, and an influence is an influence no matter how small. If any contribution from a trajectory passing through macroscopically distinct states of affairs is sufficient to make that trajectory part of the completed transaction, then every transaction will be a superposition of macroscopically distinct trajectories. Perhaps headway can be made on this problem by thinking in terms of approximately determinate trajectories. That is, one might argue that it is sufficient that transactions are never superpositions of macroscopically distinct trajectories of roughly equal amplitude. If a transaction is made up of one “main” trajectory with amplitude close to 1 superposed with a number of distinct trajectories with amplitude close to 0, the argument would go, that is equivalent (for all practical purposes) to the main trajectory alone.  Then we can say that the main trajectory represents the evolution of the state of the world, even if a small proportion of the amplitude lies elsewhere. Indeed, similar arguments have already been constructed in the context of GRW-type spontaneous collapse theories (e.g. Albert and Loewer 1996). Again, one might worry that this is tantamount to embracing a many-worlds theory (Cordero 1999), but these worries can probably be laid to rest (Lewis 2007).
6. Conclusion
The force of Maudlin’s objections to the TI has, I have argued, been underestimated, since the challenge is not merely to find a way to consistently ascribe probabilities to outcomes in examples like his, but also to find a way of reconceiving the explanatory stories that the theory tells about the formation of trajectories. Existing responses to Maudlin’s objections overlook the dual nature of the challenge, and are therefore inadequate. I have sketched a version of the TI that provides a prima facie response to Maudlin, but that version raises a number of difficulties of its own, and threatens to reduce to a form of the many-worlds interpretation. But my purpose in raising these difficulties is not to advocate the many-worlds interpretation over the TI. Quite the reverse; I think that the promise of fulfilling Einstein’s vision of a completed quantum mechanics makes the problem of finding a defensible version of the TI worth pursuing.
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